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ECCLESIASTICAL
TRIBUNALS-
PROCEDURES IN
MARITAL CASES
MONSIGNOR MARION J. REINHARDT
In 1980, the Most Reverend Charles Lefebvr6, the recently retired
dean of the Sacred Roman Rota, wrote an article on the "Defect of Con-
sent in Rotal Jurisprudence."' Although his conclusion in the article was
that no such defect presently existed, he also recognized that a new ter-
minology was developing within the field of canon law which might be
called a "Defect of Judicial Discretion."'
Our Code of Canon Law describes marriage as a consensual relation-
ship between two parties who are fit for such a commitment. This consent
is an act of the will. Each party gives and accepts a right in the body
which is perpetual, exclusive, and necessary to generate children for hu-
manity. Although we would totally agree with Lefebvr6, so much has hap-
pened in the present world to change our thinking about:
1) What is fit for persons-how old must one be?
2) What is perpetual?
3) What is exclusive?
4) What is meant by the phrase "to generate children."
Because the world gives new insights into the definition of these concepts,
we must consider them in determining what marriage presently is all
about.
The Law of Moses had demanded an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth, a life for a life.' This probably was taken from the Code of Ham-
Lefebvr6, De defectu discretionis iudicii in rotali jurisprudentia, 69 PMRODICA 555
(1980).
'Lefebvr6 emphasized that lack of discretion in marriage cases must be distinguished from
defective consent or ignorance. Id.
* Exodus 21:23-24; Leviticus 24:20.
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murabi-"Lex talionis"-an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." Pre-
viously, many crimes brought death. Under "Lex talionis," for an eye, you
could only take an eye. At the time of Christ, "Lex talionis" was miti-
gated to some extent. Punishment was in the form of fines and imprison-
ment. Under Judeo-Christian principles, more consideration was given to
internal malicious intent. Did he intend? Did he act freely? Mortal sin
demanded grievous matter, sufficient reflection and the full consent of the
will. These principles were used in the civil as well as criminal setting.
In a similar manner, Christianity refined the concept of marriage. In
the Decretals of Gregory IX, a soldier of Alexandria appealed to the Pope
on behalf of his daughter whom he had given in marriage to a man in-
flicted with insanity. In January 1205, the Pope answered:
Since this woman is not able to live with this man who suffers from a conti-
nous insanity of rage, and because the man is deprived of reason, the re-
quired marital consent was not able to be given. Consequently, if you (the
Bishop of Vertelli) find these allegations to be true, we order that the two
persons be separated from each other.$
Long before Gregory IX, the Church was accustomed to dissolving mar-
riages on the ground of lack of consent.6 For example, a marriage could be
dissolved where a person refused, before the marriage, to have a family
because he did not intend to bind himself to a permanent marriage.
These principles were clearly established in the old Decretal law which
was brought together in 1150.7 It was like force and fear in the heart of
our civil cases today but it was provable to the satisfaction of medieval
law.
Until the turn of the century, insanity had been viewed from its ex-
ternal and manifest symptoms. Many people, even in the Church, consid-
ered the insane as possessed by the devil. Marriages were considered in-
valid only if at the time of the marriage there were clear indications of
insanity. A marriage could be considered invalid only if the insanity was
still evident, or if the marriage was between two fairly close episodes of
insanity.
Thereafter, Sigmund Freud, along with many others, began to tell us
that there are many internal aspects of insanity.$ In the early parts of this
century, it became clear that a person who appeared quite sane could be
seriously unstable. Further, it was recognized that hallucinations and
delusions were not the only signs of illness. Little by little, our Roman
4 CODE OF HAMMURABI, L. 196, in ANCmNT N EAR EASTERN TEXTS 175 (J. Pritchard ed. 1955).
5 Corpus Juris Canonici, IV, Decretum Gregorii IX, I, 24.
0 See Perry, The Canonical Concept of Marital Consent: Roman Law Influences, 25 CATH.
LAW. 228, 232-33 (1980).
7 See id. See also 4 NEw CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEIA Collections of Decretals 710 (1967).
8 See generally S. FREUD, THE ORIGIN AND DrzLopumzNr OF PSYCHOANLYSIS (1910).
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jurisprudence began to consider many other signs indicative of internal
disturbances. It was shown that neuroses, anxieties, phobias and person-
ality disorders could compel men to do what could not, or should not be
done.
The "I do," or "I don't," did not always mean what was said. The "I
do" of a marriage contract meant a lot more than the idea of buying a
house or selling a car. Man had to judge whom he wanted to marry as
well as whether he wanted to marry at all. He had to act knowingly and
freely. Canon 1081 specifies the necessity of both the capacity (iure
habiles) of the parties and their consent in order for a real marriage to
come into existence.9 Canon 1081 describes consent as an act of the will,
directed to certain specific matters.10
Although the Code of Canon Law seems to speak rather rigidly of
knowledge and volition in reference to matrimonial consent, in recent
years, under the influence of information obtained from the behavioral
sciences, canonical jurisprudence is demanding more to establish consent
than simply conceptual knowledge and the volitional "I do." The Church
has always taught that important decisions in life must be truly human
acts, that in these areas man must be master of his fate and the captain
of his soul. This applies especially to matrimonial consent which consti-
tutes one of the most important decisions in a person's life.
In a landmark decision in 1941, Wynen taught that matrimonial con-
sent required the ability or capacity to evaluate:
In many judgments there is a double element to acknowledge, the one rep-
resentative or conceptual, the other evaluative. Both elements must be con-
sidered especially in practical judgment. It must be noted that the use of
reason which is required for every human act looks both to the conceptual
as well as the evaluative knowledge."'
This is a landmark decision because for the first time there is a distinc-
tion between "I do" and what really takes place within. Other decisions of
the Rota express similar sentiments.1"
All anomalies of the personality causing grave damage to the will po-
tentially are preventive of valid matrimonial consent. If experts agree
that before the marriage began the necessary integrity was lacking, such a
person must be considered incapable of instituting a permanent existence
with another human being. Likewise, that person must be considered in-
capable of undertaking the responsibility of procreation and education of
* CODEX JURIS CANONICI, Can. 1081, § 1. See generally F. DLLA ROCCA, MANUAL OF CANON
LAw 286-99 (1959).
" CODEX JURIS CANONICI, Can. 1081, § 2.
" Coram Wynen, S.R.R. Dec., vol. XXXIII, p. 149 (1941).
" See, e.g., Coram Jullien, S.R.R. Dec., vol. XXVII, p. 79 (1935); Coram Sabattani, S.R.R.
Dec., vol. LIII, p. 159 (1961).
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children. "There would be lacking in such a case that discretion of judg-
ment which would be necessary for a valid judgment about marriage. '13
For centuries canonical jurisprudence has held that an incapacity to
perform the essential physical act of marriage resulted in nullity. This is
found in Canon 1068.14 Based on knowledge supplied by the behavioral
sciences, our jurisprudence began to acknowledge basic inabilities arising
from psychic causes. For example, Sabattani wrote that a nymphomaniac
was incapable of fulfilling the essential property of fidelity."
The Second Vatican Council, in "Gaudium et Spes,'"' discussing the
action by which marriage is entered, clearly teaches that the intimate
partnership of married life, established by the Creator, is rooted in the
conjugal covenant of irrevocable personal consent."1 "Hence, by that
human act, whereby spouses mutually bestow and accept each other, a
relationship arises which by divine will and in the eyes of society is a
lasting one."1' This statement of the Second Vatican Council has a spe-
cial significance. It does not consider just the mere fact of the establish-
ment of a partnership of life (communitas vitae) but considers the right
and obligation of this intimate partnership of life, which has as its most
specific element the intimate union by which a man and a woman become
one flesh, and toward which the partnership of life tends as to its summit.
This proves that marriage is an extremely personal relationship, and that
the matrimonial consent is an act of the will by which the spouses "mutu-
ally bestow and accept each other," that is, "in regard to certain actions
and gestures, but it does not deny that the actions and gestures are ex-
tremely vital and affect the totality of the human person in some way.' "
The Second Vatican Council also stated that in marriage "in facto
esse," while the communion of life may be absent, the right to the com-
munion of life can never be. Therefore, a more accurate definition of mat-
rimonial consent is the following: the act of the will by which a man and a
woman, through the covenant between them, that is, through irrevocable
consent, establish the perpetual and the exclusive communion of conjugal
life that is aimed by its natural character to the generation of children.
The formal object of this consent is not only the right to the body but
also the right to the communion of life. This includes living together
which is properly called matrimonial, and the related obligations, such as
" Coram Anne, S.R.R. Dec. (unpublished) (22 Julii 1969).
" CODEX JuRIs CANONICI, Can. 1068, § 1.
" Coram Sabattani, S.R.R. Dec., vol. IL, p. 503 (1957).
"e Gaudium et Spes (The Church in the Modern World), reprinted in W. ABo'rr, THE Doc-
.UMENTS OF THE VATICAN 199 (1966).
17 W. ABBOrT, supra note 16, at 250.
18 Id.
U. NAVARRETE, STRUCTURA JURIDICA MATRIMONI, SECUNDUM CONCILIUM VATICANUM II 75
(1968).
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the right to the intimate partnership of persons and of acts by which
"they perfect each other, so that they may cooperate with God in the
generation and rearing of new lives."12 0 This thinking is also found in deci-
sions rendered by the Roman Rota.2
In the past, there has been very little difficulty in matters concerning
schizophrenia or even manic-depression psychosis. These have recogniza-
ble signs. More significantly, problems have been noticed in cases involv-
ing personality disorders which generally arise very early in an individ-
ual's life and usually without his or her awareness. The victim develops
an abnormal behavior pattern which frustrates him in the process of ma-
turing and the development of normal human relationships. This lack of
self-awareness, coupled with the lack of maturity, prevents the individual
from being able to make the informed judgment necessary for a valid
matrimonial consent. In addition, if his disorder is severe and disruptive
of conjugal life, consent is impossible since one cannot consent to some-
thing he is unable to do.
22
What then are we to say of the present dean of the Sacred Roman
Rota, Most Monsignor Henrick Ewers, speaking on March 17, 1978 before
a conference of Rotal judges, advocates, other officials, and to his Holi-
ness, Pope John Paul II:
Finally at one time juridic relevance was accorded only to such clear
mental illnesses as, for example, schizophrenia. Today, it is being ever more
generally accepted that mere psychopathies just as much as, and perhaps,
even more than psychoses can lead to the nullity of matrimonial consent.
The examples could be multiplied, and in each instance we could dis-
cover "dubia iuris" slowly being transformed into certitudes in one direction
or another.
Now then, this progress to which we have been referring demonstrates
something of great importance, namely, that our illustrious predeces-
sors-and in part, we too-have not been content to analyze, illustrate, and
subtly interpret the test of the law but, rather, have been willing to look
deeply into things in their development (a development oftentimes chaotic
and precipitous), and to take proper advantage of the elasticity of Canon
Law (a merit, not a defeat, of the system). Thus, they hav6 freed themselves
from a comfortable immobilism, avoided mere abstraction, and often
reached appropriate solutions from the point of view both of the law and of
common sense.
So Humanae Vitae, Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI on the Regulation of Birth, § 8, given
on July 25, 1968.
" See e.g., Coram Anne, S.R.R. Dec. (unpublished) (25 Februarii 1969).
'2 See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 305-30 (3d ed. 1980); Salzman, Other Character-Personality Syn-
dromes: Schizoid, Inadequate, Passive-Aggressive, Paranoid, Dependent, in 3 AMERICAN
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 225 (1974).
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Can it be said that this is an application in Canon Law of the so-called
"evolutionary" method? So be it. However, no one will deny that what has
been done has been kept within well defined limits, has been carried for-
ward with careful attention to the Magisterium, and has developed without
contradictions not only the individual norms of the law but also the whole
complex of the law. Nor could anyone diminish the immense influence of
the Second Vatican Council in all of this especially over the past several
years.
It is therefore with sentiments of deep gratitude that we wish on this
solemn occasion to recall so many worthy priests-among them, Your Holi-
ness, a son of your own noble nation-who over the past seventy years have
been and continue to be our guides, and who in fact have opened secure
channels towards the unfolding of justice.13
On January 25, 1981 Pope John Paul II spoke to the same conference
of rotal judges, advocates and officials, and mentioned that a negative in-
fluence would result from sentences when granted with too much facility.
The words of Pope John Paul II were not intended to limit or to diminish
the work of the Rota in Rome. Instead, his words were intended to limit
local tribunals throughout the world. He praised the Rota for its vigilance
in safeguarding the lower tribunals of the world by ensuring that the law
and the procedural norms are properly observed. Although judicial indis-
cretions are bound to occur, we must see to it that they are kept to a
minimum. Certainly, the Church in America has done much to make ca-
non law a more liveable forum. We must remember, however, that to
avoid abuses the Constitution Dei Miseratione of Benedict XIV 4 made it
necessary to have a defender of the bond, a three-judge panel, and a nec-
essary appeal from a first court.25
There is no difficulty with the presence of an active, vivacious de-
fender of the marriage bond, but we might ask ourselves whether justice
can be afforded in today's world by requiring that the case be heard in
the place of contact or in the domicile or quasi-domicile by a three-judge
panel with a necessary appeal from a trial court. I think that justice de-
mands that most people, who are forcibly separated, have a right to be
heard in a place where they can be easily heard. The rights involved are
so complex and intimate that "rogatory commissions" are of no value. To
fly from one place to another is also a great disadvantage. If we are going
back to an age when cases took, at a minimum, 2 to 5 years to be heard,
that is well and good; our people of today, however, are not willing to
22 Address by Most Monsignor Ewers, Conference of Rotal Judges (Mar. 17, 1978).
Constitution, Dei Miseratione of Benedict XIV of November 3, 1741.
I6 d. See generally J. KING, THE CANONICAL PROCEDURE IN SEPARATION CASEs 42-43 (1952).
Canons 1960-89 govern the procedure for marriage trials. See CODEX JURIS CANONICI, Cans.
1960-89. See generally S. WoYwooD, A PRACTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW
364-84 (1952).
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return to such an era.
We might ask ourselves "Why does the Roman Rota handle so few
cases a year-from two to three hundred"? The cases at the Rota are
handled from the standpoint of facts as well as from law, even though the
original court might have been justified in thinking otherwise. Should not
the trial court be in a better position to judge the facts? Second, so few
cases are brought to the Rota on questions of psychological importance.
Most cases before the Rota concern questions of not wanting children, of
getting a divorce, and of force and fear. Many of the cases could be han-
dled on such ordinary grounds, but psychological proofs are. easier. Third,
when the Rota gets a case on psychological grounds, most of the impor-
tant facts are not mentioned since the record is not complete. A recent
local psychiatrist at the Rota mentioned that if they could only see the
people, the findings would be different. Fourth, the Rota only has refer-
ence cases from other tribunals throughout the world; they only get what
others send them.
In most cases involving common psychological grounds, there is a
need for deeply ingrained psychological and psychiatric men and women
who have a canonical background. There generally is no need for parties
to go back entirely to their childhood. For the most part, they are that
way because of the nature of their personalities. Indeed, with training and
assistance another marriage might prove quite ideal.
The ultimate question that must be addressed in light of our discus-
sion is: "Can a tribunal such as the local court system and the Roman
Rota continue to exist in present day society"? One of my reasons for
believing that it cannot is that, in many cases, the system only results in
fear and frustration. It is different in countries such as Italy and Spain
where civil effects are involved. For the rest of us, it can lead only to
unnecessary difficulties. Where it is going to lead only to years of endless
litigation-because of paranoid ideas-would it'not be better to institute
an administrative procedure which could solve the particular matter? The
ecclesiastical court system must be changed. We must try to find all the
facts of each case and try to render our decisions accordingly. We agree
with Monsignor Lefebvr6 that no new jurisprudence exists in the Church.
Our judgments, however, must come from all of the facts, even the most
intimate and confidentially established. We must work to achieve a
greater justice for all involved.
